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COMMENT
THE AMENDMENT OF THE WASTE STATUTE-
RETROGRESSION?*
"This court early in its history announced the doctrine that the rule
allowing recovery of exemplary -and punitive damages was unsound in
principle, and held that such damages were not recoverable in this jurisI
"Waste is an unreasonable and improper use and abuse, mismanage-
ment, or omission of duty touching real estate by one rightfully in posses-
sion, which results in substantial injury thereto. It is a violation of the
obligation of the tenant to treat the premises in such a manner that no
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diction, unless expressly so provided by statute."' So stated Mr. Justice
Fullerton in 1926 when the Washington court refused to award treble
damages for a violation of the waste statute2 in the leading case prior
to the 1943 amendment.' In face of such a strongly stated judicial
harm be done to them, and that the estate may revert to those having the
reversionary interest, without material deterioration." Moore v. Twin City
Ice & Cold Storage Co., 92 Wash. 608, 611, 159 Pac. 779 (1916).
Cf. R aiV. REV. STAT. (1932) § 601. "Until the expiration of the time
allowed for redemption the court may restrain the commission of waste on
the property. But it is not waste for the person in possession of the property
at the time of the sale or entitled to possession afterwards during the period
allowed for redemption to continue to use it in the same manner in
which it was previously used, or to use it in the ordinary course of hus-
bandry, or to make the necessary repairs of buildings thereon, or to use
wood or timber on the property therefor, or for the repairs of fences, or
for fuel in his family while he occupies the property."
It is not the purpose of this comment to present an exhaustive discussion
of the waste statute or problems. In fact there are relatively few waste
cases in the Washington reports, and some of them do not present anything
of particular importance. The problem arises usually when the landlord
seeks either multiple damages or forfeiture of the tenancy.
In the following cases the court found there had been no waste: Morris
v. Shell Oil Co., 167 Wash. 331, 9 P. (2d) 354 (1932) (Painting plaintiff's
building in defendant's distinctive colors at tenant's request, no permanent
damage, not waste, even though it may have offended the aesthetic sense);
Lee v. Weerda, 124 Wash. 168, 213 Pac. 919 (1923) (Growth of Canadian
thistles, neglect of fruit trees, destruction of berry bushes, merely ill hus-
husbandry, not waste); Moore v. Twin City Ice & Cold Storage Co., 92 Wash.
608, 159 Pac. 779 (1916) (Tenant piled sand and gravel on the land prepara-
tory to use in building on adjoining land, left some to make a driveway;
there was no decrease of commercial value ($2,200) although there might
have been decrease of agricultural value ($200)); Byrkett v. Gardner, 35
Wash. 668, 77 Pac. 1048 (1904) (Failure to farm in good husbandlike manner
or keep fences in repair, not waste).
In the following cases the acts were recognized to constitute waste but
apparently no right to treble damages was found: DeLano v. Tennent, 138
Wash. 39, 244 Pac. 273, 45 A. L. R. 766 (1926) (Discussed in text); Cogswell
v. Brown, 102 Wash. 625, 173 Pac. 623 (1918) (Mortgagor during period of
redemption may get accounting for waste from cutting of timber for com-
mercial purposes, but under REM. REV. STAT. (1932) § 601 (single damages)
and not under §§ 939 and 940 (companion to waste statute; relating to "tim-
ber trespass")); Crodle v. Dodge, 99 Wash. 121, 168 Pac. 986 (1917) (In
action to set aside deed, no accounting for rents and profits but removal
of timber for commercial purposes was waste and accounting therefor
allowed); McDowell v. Beckham, 72 Wash. 224, 130 Pac. 350 (1913) (Cutting
timber by life tenant's grantees is waste, not a possessory act to base
adverse possession; issue as to ownership of condemnation award when
land was taken by City of Seattle).
The reluctance of the court to award forfeiture is indicated by North-
craft v. Blumauer, 53 Wash. 243, 101 Pac. 871 (1909) (Easement owner
gravelled logging railroad right-of-way rather than timbered it; not such
waste as would authorize forfeiture).
Miscellaneous other cases: Brundage v. Home Savings & Loan Associa-
tion, 11 Wash. 277, 39 Pac. 666 (1895) (Mortgagee in possession committing
waste, not alone authorization for appointment of receiver to collect rents,
etc.); Arment v. Hensel, 5 Wash. 152, 31 Pac. 464 (1892) ("Waste" referred
to in REm. REV. STAT. (1932) § 941 is not technical waste requiring act by
one lawfully in possession); McLeod v. Ellis, 2 Wash. 117, 26 Pac. 76 (1891)
(Court found action to be for conversion of trees severed, in order to find
action transitory-the waste and timber trespass statutes are discussed).
IDeLano v. Tennent, 138 Wash. 39, 47, 244 Pac. 273, 45 A. L. R. 766, 771
(1926).
2 REm. REV. STAT. (1932) § 938.
'WASH. LAWS 1943, c. 22, p. 40.
COMMENT
position and the apparent legislative acquiescence in the doctrine, it is
a bit of a surprise to read the 1943 legislature's amendment of the waste
statute which seems in direct opposition to the quoted doctrine.
In 1854, the territorial legislature enacted a statute, which upon a
showing of waste authorized a judgment for compensatory damages,
forfeiture of the estate, and eviction from the premises. Fifteen years
later, in 1869, the statute was changed to provide that in an action of
waste "there may be judgment for treble damages." The language of
the 1869 statute5 survived the Code of 18816 and finally appeared as
Rem. Rev. Stat. (1932) Sec. 938. In Chapter 22, Laws of 1943, the
legislature made the first change in seventy-four years, and on a prelim-
inary reading the statute now seems to take the final retrogressive step7
in a change from mere compensatory damages to mandatory treble
damages.
The statute now after the 1943 change reads:
If a guardian, tenant in severalty or in common, for life or
for years, or by sufferance, or at will, or a sub-tenant, of real
property commit waste thereon, any person injured thereby
may maintain an action at law for damages therefor against
such guardian or tenant or sub-tenant; in which action, if the
plaintiff prevails, there shall be judgment for treble damages,
or for fifty dollars ($50), whichever is greater, and the court
in addition may decree forfeiture of the estate of the party
committing or permitting the waste, and of eviction from the
property. The judgment, in any event, shall include as part
of the costs of the prevailing party a reasonable attorney'sfee to be fixed by the court. But judgment of forfeiture and
eviction shall only be given in favor of the person entitled to
the reversion against the tenant in possession, when the injury
to the estate in reversion is determined in the action to be
equal to the value of the tenant's estate or unexpired term, or
to have been done or suffered in malice.8
The most important change is the ubstitution of "shall" for "may"
of the former statute in the clause "there shall be judgment for treble
damages." The signficance of this change is dearer when DeLano v.
Tennent" is considered. In that case the tenant at the end of the term
had extensively damaged the leased premises by removing certain fix-
tures which he mistakenly, but in good faith, believed he was privileged
to remove. The plaintiff landlord contended that treble damages should
have been awarded under the statute, but the court rejected this con-
tention, making the statement of policy quoted above and concluding
that the statute penalized only wilful and wanton acts of waste, and
that for waste committed innocently only compensatory damages could
be recovered.
I WAsF. TErm. LAws 1854, § 403, p. 206.
WAsa. TERa. LAWS 1869, § 555, p. 143.
'As § 601.
7 Retrogressive, that is, assuming the policy stated by the court in the
DeLano case is correct.8R REmv. REv. STAT. (1943 supp.) § 938. The italicized parts are additions
by the 1943 act; except for changing "may" to "shall," the 1943 act merely
made additions to the statute without change of the existing language.
9 Supra note 1.
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It has generally been true that the provisions of waste statutes author-
izing multiple damage awards are strictly construed,10 but this normally
has meant that multiple damages will be awarded for voluntary waste 1
whether innocently committed or not, and only single damages for
permissive waste.' 2 Although the variance between the permissive
"may" and the mandatory "shall" might not compel the court to reach
a different conclusion, under the limitation of the permissive language
of the statute announced in DeLano v. Tennent, it would appear that
the legislature by changing to "shall" has flatly rejected the policy
against awarding multiple damages and has gone beyond the position
normally reached in American jurisdictions.
Until the new statute is construed by the court, it cannot be deter-
mined just what effect the change will have, but despite its seeming
drastic character, it is suggested that a preferable construction of the
statute will make the Washington position the same as that elsewhere.
The language of the statute can be divided into two general parts. The
first part refers to the awarding of treble damages and authorizes an
action "if a ... tenant . . . commit waste . . ." The second part of the
statute authorizes forfeiture against "the party committing or permitting
the waste . . ." The second part also authorizes eviction, and provides
that judgment of forfeiture and eviction shall be given only if the injury
to the estate in reversion is determined "to be equal to the value of the
tenant's estate or unexpired term, or to have been done or suffered in
malice." (Emphasis supplied.)
In light of the policy or doctrine against punitive damages which was
so vigorously stated by the court in the DeLano case, it is suggested that
the variance in the language of the two parts of the statute justifies a
construction that only voluntary waste is to be penalized by treble
damages. Notice that the language relating to treble damages penalizes
a tenant who commits waste, whereas the language with reference to
forfeiture and eviction penalizes not only the tenant who commits but
also the one who permits waste.'
The amendment also provides for a minimum recovery by the plaintiff
of $50 and the award of reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing
party. There formerly were no similar provisions.
One additional problem should be pointed out. Before the 1943 amend-
ment no tenant holding an estate less than an estate for years was
within the scope of the statute. The 1943 amendment includes tenants
by sufferance, tenants at will, and sub-tenants. If it was advisable to
10 See RESTATEMIENT, PROPERTY (1936) §§ 198, 199.
" An injury to the premises resulting from the tenant's affirmative act,
e.g., tearing down a shed, cutting trees, is voluntary waste. An injury
resulting from the tenant's failure to act when it is his duty to act, e.g.,
failure to keep the structure in repair, is permissive waste. See RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY (1936) § 138, "Duty not to diminish market value of sub-
sequent interests," on voluntary waste; and id. § 139, "Duty not to permit
deterioration of land or structures," on permissive waste. These two
sections discuss a life tenant's duties but the discussion is also applicable
to a leaseholder.12 Notes, "Construction and effect of statutory provision for double or
treble damages against tenant committing waste." 45 A. L. R. 771 (1926).
"3 The fifth subdivision of the unlawful detainer statute also recognizes
this distinction: "A tenant of real property for a term less than life is
guilty of unlawful detainer . . . (5) when he commits or permits waste
upon the demised premises .. ." REm. REv. STAT. (1932) § 812.
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extend the coverage of the statute, it would seem that the inclusion of
the periodic tenant would have been most important. Until the recent
case of Najewitz v. City of Seattle," it was rather generally thought that
there were no tenants at will in Washington.1 5 Certainly the ordinary
tenant in this state for an indefinite time is a tenant from period to
period (usually month to month) under the provisions of Rem. Rev.
Stat. (1933) Sec. 10619.
Before the 1943 change it could have been argued that the periodic
tenant is essentially a tenant at will with the statute defining the notice
necessary to terminate his tenancy.1 6 Such a conclusion would make
inappropriate the inclusion of the periodic tenant within the waste
statute, inasmuch as the tenant at will ordinarily cannot be guilty of
waste. His act, which is of the same character as waste, technically,
amounts to a termination of his tenancy, and he is held liable therefor
as a trespasser and not as a wrongdoing tenant.'7 Now, it would seem,
the amendment prevents finding a periodic tenant guilty of waste under
the statutei 8 even though other "lesser" tenants are included
The wisdom of the enactment of the 1943 statute is certainly open to
doubt, and as the foregoing discussion indicates the new law may have
raised problems just as serious as those (whatever they were) the
amendment was designed to correct.
HARRY M. CROSS
1421 Wn.(2d) 656, 152 P.(2d) 722 (1944). Noted, (1945) 20 WASH. L.
RnLV. 169.
25 C, REsTAT EME, PROPERTY, WASH. ANNOT. (1940) § 21.
'
61t seems to be clear, at least, that the tenancy from period to period
developed to avoid the undesirable features of the strict tenancy at will.
See 7 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW (1926) 243-244-
2 See TnFANY, REAL POPERTY (3d ed., 1939) § 631. This would mean
recovery of single damages as against an ordinary trespasser, unless the
damage was within the scope of the "timber trespass" statute (Rmun. REv.
STAT. (1932) § 939.)
"
8 This, of course, does not mean that a periodic tenant cannot be
restricted by a covenant against waste. It could be argued that before the
1943 change the statute applied to (1) tenants in common generally, (2)
life tenants, and (3) leaseholders, i.e., that the phrase "tenant for years"
was not used technically (referring to a tenant for a fixed term), but rather
meant all leaseholders-non-freeholders. The express inclusion of certain
non-freeholders by the 1943 change seems to indicate the exclusion of other
non-freeholders.
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